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Investigating allegations of voter fraud is a difficult and time-consuming process. Statistical methods have been developed which can augment -but probably not replace -this necessary task. A significant advantage of these techniques is that they do not require the participation of on-site observers or investigators. Access to the tabulated voting tallies alone is usually sufficient to carry out the necessary analysis.
Beber and Scacco [4] have developed one such model for analyzing voting tallies. Their methods exploit the apparent difficulties human subjects experience when attempting to fabricate statistically random numbers. For the 2009 Afghanistan presidential election, Weidmann [26] applied this model to map anomalous patterns of voting at the province level. The discrepancies identified appear to be correlated with the patterns of voting fraud reported by the ECC. In the analysis to be described, we use several tests suggested by Beber and Scacco to analyze the raw voting data collected within a single Afghan province -Helmand. More specifically, we analyzed selected statistical signatures for the four leading presidential candidates, and attempt to identify any biased patterns that are present. One limitation is that the proposed model is invalid for small raw vote counts, and the latter were reported for many local candidates entered in the presidential election.
________________ Manuscript approved July 26, 2011.
Our study was guided by two questions:
(1) Are there significant differences between the statistical signatures of the leading candidates?
(2) Did the subsequent vote certification process rectify the observed biases?
2) Statistical Models for Anomaly Analysis
a) The Beber-Scacco Model
In both controlled laboratory and uncontrolled non-laboratory settings, human beings show distinct biases when asked to generate 'random' numbers. In some experiments, subjects favored numbers that terminate in low digits over choices that would result in a uniform distribution of the terminal digits. In addition, human subjects tend to underestimate the probability that any two consecutive penultimate (next to last) and terminal digits will be identical when generating a sequence of random numbers. If the digits from zero to nine are uniformly distributed, the probability of two consecutive random digits being identical is 10%. Based on the experimental psychology literature, Beber and Scacco concluded:
The literature thus suggests three key findings: (1) For the above statement to be true, three propositions must be satisfied. (See 4, Appendix). An important exception is that the third proposition -and therefore the assumption that the last digits of the vote tallies are uniformly distributed -is invalid if there is a "non-trivial probability of observing less than eighteen votes for a unit of interest" [4, p.5] . This can and did happen for many of the minor candidates in the 2009 Afghanistan presidential election. The implications of deviation from the model's assumptions will be discussed subsequently. An additional implication is that this model is only applicable to ballot box level data (i.e. raw vote counts). The assumption that the ultimate and penultimate (next to last) digits are uniformly and independently distributed will no longer be true if the data is averaged, or otherwise aggregated. Given that three propositions are satisfied, the authors prove that the expected number of repetitionsˆ R ep (i.e. consecutive draws of the same last digit) is:
Let N=2, and b = 10 [the ten digits from 0 to 9]. The probability that the terminal and penultimate digits will be identical is therefore (2-1)/10 = .1
Beber and Scacco have applied their model to the analysis of two elections. In the case of the Swedish parliamentary election [2002] , the assumption of uniformly-distributed last-digits was supported. In the case of the Nigerian presidential election [2003] , in which wide-spread fraud was documented, this assumption was significantly violated. In the frequencies of the last digits, zero was substantially overrepresented [4, p. 13] . Interestingly, on the same return sheets, zero is also overrepresented in counts of the last digit of the number of registered voters (not the vote count), and the last digit of the number of votes received by the incumbent People's Democratic Party (PDP). Leaders of the PDP were particularly flagrant in terms of packing the ballot boxes, and directing voters on how to complete their ballots. In a large number of wards, the authors also note that digit pairs are adjacent much more frequently than expected, based on the assumed uniform distribution of the digits. In Weidmann's analysis of Afghanistan voting patterns [26] , overrepresentation of the terminal digit '0' was the most common finding. Other biases, such as the overrepresentation of the digit '5,' were also noted.
b) Other Forensic Applications of Probability Theory
Given the apparent difficulty humans have in fabricating truly random numbers, investigators have also used probability models for analyzing other types of data. Given any sufficiently large set of nominally random number sequences, irrespective of their source, appropriate statistical tests may be used to determine if the criterion of randomness is satisfied.
O'Kelly [18] asked qualified physicians to fabricate scores on a standard scale for depression for subjects at three different sites. This data was then interleaved with authentic data from an additional 18 sites. A statistician who examined the data for unusual means and correlations succeeded in identifying one of the three target sites correctly, while incorrectly flagging a second legitimate site. Although this study was only partially successful, it does suggest the utility of probability theory for helping to identify fraudulent data.
Mosimann et al. [14, 24] review the application of the analysis of terminal digits to a variety of scientific data sets. In all four cases, manipulation or fabrication of data was strongly suspected. These studies were conducted by the Office of Research Integrity, DHHS (United States Department of Health and Human Services). The first two cases involved the analysis of published data -falsified scintillation counts for a series of radioassays, and partially falsified data enumerated for bacterial cultures. The third case discusses the analysis of the distribution of muscle fiber action potentials (i.e. muscle fiber "firings"), and the fourth analyzes blood flow measurements purportedly made on the hind limb of rats for two different experimental conditions. In each of these four cases, the last digit analysis helped to confirm the partial fabrication of reported data.
In an intriguing paper, Nigrini [17] discusses the significance of analyzing the distribution of initial digits for detecting anomalies in financial data. Benford's Law asserts that for many classes of financial and demographic data, the first digit is more likely to be low [1, 2, or 3] than high [8, 9, 10] . Specifically, Benford's law asserts that the probability that the first digit D 1 will equal a digit d 1 between 1 and 9 is:
Nigrini demonstrates that a series of 23 fraudulent checks (17, p. 82) violate the above observation. Although the perpetrator attempted to randomize the amount of each check, the initial digits for the amounts were typically 8 or 9, and occasionally 7. In some cases, this
{ } approach can be generalized further by examining the distribution of values for the first two digits of selected financial variables.
c) Biases in Random Number Generation by Human Subjects i) Overview
Many studies have reported biases when human subjects are asked to either construct random sequences of binary or decimal numbers -or conversely, to differentiate between random and non-random sequences. These findings, however, are more ambiguous than the above summary would indicate [4] . Vague or inaccurate instructions, as well as a lack of real-time feedback, can both exacerbate the biases observed in the human generation of "random" sequences of numbers. We should also note that a machine-generated sequence of numbers may be judged as subjectively random, yet still be nonrandom in a statistical sense [21] .
As an example of study which clearly demonstrated the human biases, Boland and Hutchinson [5] asked subjects to generate random sequences of 25 digits from the set of ten digits [0, 1, 2, … , 8, 9] . They found that the digit '0' was substantially underreported, and that the incidence of repeated digits was lower than predicted for truly random sequences.
Many other studies have investigated the generation of binary sequences of numbers or tokens. In a review of the literature, Nickerson [16] reported that the most common finding is that subjects asked to generate random binary sequences produce sequences for which the frequency of alteration (i.e. the frequency of transitions from '1' to '0' and vice versa) is greater than that predicted by probability theory. When asked to identify random sequences of binary numbers, subjects also tend to select sequences for which the frequency of alteration is higher than would be produced by a truly random process.
It is almost certainly erroneous to conclude that people are inherently incapable of generating or recognizing random sequences of numbers. This is an important point, because of its bearing on the question as to whether knowledgeable individuals could successfully fabricate data that could evade detection by the type of statistical test describe herein. For one, biases in the generation of random sequences may sometimes reflect imprecise direction on the part of the experimenter. Given vague or ambiguous direction, subjects may apply private criteria for generating random sequences, and this criterion may differ substantially from the expectations of the experimenter. 
ii) Random Number Generation with Feedback
More so, given active feedback during the course of an experiment, subjects are capable of generating sequences that are nearly random. Two examples are given below.
Rapoport and Budesco [20] analyzed the behavior of students playing a two-person competitive game. Each student was asked to pick a black card or a red card; one student won if the cards matched, the other won if they didn't. The first group of players was provided feedback on each turn with respect to the outcome, prior to making their next selection (Condition D, for dyad). The second group of players was asked to list their 150 selections in advance i.e. the sequence or black and red cards (Condition S, for single). As a control, a third group of students selected the color of the card to be played by mentally simulating a coin toss 150 times (Condition R, for randomization). It might appear that Condition R and S used identical protocols, because in both cases, the students were asked to generate a sequence of 150 choices a priori. However, members of the S group were asked to generate a viable sequence of choices that would subsequently be tested against an opponent, whereas students in the R group were simply instructed to treat each choice as an independent simulated coin toss.
The sequences were analyzed with respect to runs (i.e. consecutive cards of the same value) and sequential dependencies for the conditional probabilities between choices. The sequences generated for Condition D were more nearly random than the sequences generated in the R group. The sequences generated in Condition S were intermediate. Because each player viewed the other's player's choice at each turn, his opponent was given the opportunity to strategically exploit any nonrandom aspects of the sequence of card choices presented. This protocol enforced the generation of effectively random choice sequences of choices by both players. The outcome supported the investigator's hypothesis that "The hypothesis
is that in this situation [Condition D] people would display randomlike behavior not because they are instructed to do so but because this is the best and most effective way of achieving a desired goal [20, p. 360]."
Neuringer [15] also provided feedback for his subjects, but in the context of generating random sequences that were compared with the output from a random number generator (RNG). The subjects were asked to create random binary sequences ('1's and '2's) of 100 numbers. Following a baseline session, in which the subject-generated sequences were demonstrably non-random, the subjects were provided with statistical feedback after each 100 number sequence had been generated. Based on the five statistical measures provided, all subjects learn to generate sequences that were indistinguishable from those produced by a random number generator. The sequences were not completely random, as could be demonstrated by using additional statistical tests, but the latter were not used to provide feedback to the subjects during the experiment.
3) Data Sources
The models that we will apply require unaggregated (i.e. "raw") vote counts. In order to understand the subsequent data analysis, it is necessary to briefly review the protocols for the prior Afghanistan presidential election. Afghanistan has 34 provinces; each province is divided into districts. There are usually multiple Polling Centers within each district, and each Polling Center will usually have multiple Polling Stations -usually several for males, one for females, and sometimes a station for Kuchi (Afghan Pashtun nomads) (Figure 2 ). Within the Helmand Province, 404 polling stations were eventually certified, and 144 polling stations were uncertified, for a total of 548 polling stations. The tallies reported for the polling stations are at the level of the ballot box. [10] ; this list included all reported vote counts, including vote counts for polling stations that were eventually disqualified [9] . The final certified presidential results were also obtained, and the former was partitioned into certified and uncertified vote counts.
Obviously, the number of "last digits" that can be tabulated for each candidate in Helmand cannot exceed the number of polling stations in a given category (i.e. 
4) Observed Biases (a) Low-Digit Bias:
There is a greater bias towards higher counts than expected for the lower digits of '1', '2', and '3.' This bias occurs because candidates other than Karzai often received low vote counts of 1, 2, or 3 votes at many different polling station locations ( Figure 3 ). This is unsurprising, given Karzai's dominance in the total vote counts (see Table 2 preceding, and Tables 3 and 4 on page 12). As shown in Figure 3 , when vote counts greater than 10 are tabulated, this bias is largely eliminated. (In addition, vote counts of less than 18 violate the assumptions of the Beber-Scacco model.) There is still an apparent under-representation of the digit 6.
(b) Zero-Digit Bias:
Karzai's raw vote counts contained a disproportionate number of values that were rounded off to zero, e.g. 50, 600, etc. None of the distributions for the other three candidates displayed a comparable bias. In Karzai's certified vote counts, only 12% of the last-digits terminated in zero, but in the uncertified counts, almost 35% did (Figure 4) . A Chi-squared Goodness-of-Fit-Test was conducted for the last-digit distribution of the certified vote counts for Karzai. The null hypothesis is that the samples were drawn from a uniform underlying distribution. The Chi-square value is 13.48, with 9 degrees of freedom. The two-tailed p value is .1418; at a significance level of p = .05, the null hypothesis can no longer be rejected. Because the sample sizes are small [27, see p. 822], the test was also replicated using Fisher's exact test for small sample sizes [13] , with comparable results. More colloquially, the distribution of the last digits for Karzai's certified votes cannot be statistically differentiated from the hypothetical unbiased distribution illustrated in Figure 1 .
In contrast, Figure 5 on the following page shows a comparable distribution for Abdullah. The digit zero is underrepresented for both the certified and uncertified last-digit analysis. The digits '1', '2', and '3' are overrepresented partially due to the low-digit bias. This is apparent in Figure 6 . The distribution of the last-digits for vote counts of 10 or greater more nearly approximate the expected value of 10. Some reported vote counts were so anomalous that we initially considered the possibility that clerical errors had occurred during the tabulation process. If not, these counts would appear to provide prima facie evidence of electoral fraud at selected polling stations, a conclusion consistent with the subsequent findings of the ECC. A singular example is that exactly 600 votes were allegedly cast for Hamed Karzai at 24 different polling stations, in 13 different polling centers in Helmand. No votes were recorded for any other candidate at these stations. The results from these polling stations were disqualified in final certified vote counts. Although this example is particularly egregious, these anomalies were also captured by the statistical approach described in this paper. The digit '0' was overrepresented as a terminal digit in the raw tabulations for Karzai, and the terminal double-digit zero-zero ('00') was also overrepresented.
Obviously, a statistical approach cannot capture all types of potentially fraudulent behavior. It was noted (25) 
(d) The Double-Digit Distribution
Beber and Scacco [4] also examined the distribution of the two terminal (penultimate and ultimate) digits of the reported voting counts. If the assumptions of the model are satisfied, the probability that the last two digits will be identical is 10%.
Given the data at hand, the relatively low vote counts create a difficulty. As an example, there are 350 vote counts greater than zero reported for Karzai for the certified counts (see Table 4 ). (i.e. 350 is the number of polling stations at which Karzai received one or more votes; this number should not be confused with the total sum of the vote count of 47271.) The expected value for the total number of doubled terminal digits is therefore 0.10 X 350 = 35. Since there are ten digits, the expected number of doubled terminal digits for each of the ten digits (i.e. the possible doubled terminal digits are '00', '11', '22', '33', '44', '55', '66', '77', '88', '99) is only 3.5. This violates the assumption of proposition three [4] that the expected values for any count will be at least 18. Even given this limitation, it is still instructive to examine the distribution of terminal double-digits for Karzai. As can be seen in Figure 7 , the frequency of terminal double-digits much more closely approximates the expected value of 3.5 in the certified data than in the uncertified data. The number of terminal double-digit zeros (i.e. '0-0') has been reduced from 33 to 10.
In the certified data, there were a total of 38 doubled terminal digits, and 312 single terminal digits. Given expected proportions of 1:9, the chi-square was computed to be .198, with p = 0.656 for a two-tailed test. The null hypothesis that the total number of doubled digits deviates from the expected value of 3.5 cannot be rejected at a significance level of 0.05.
5) Conclusions
Two different types of biases were observed: a "low-digit" bias for the four top candidates (i.e. the lower-digits were over-represented as the terminal digits of the raw voting counts), and a "zero-digit" terminal-digit bias for Hamed Karzai alone. The first was shown to be a statistical artifact; the second, a real effect that was eliminated in the certified vote counts. This suggests that the zero-digit statistical anomaly observed in Karzai's data was both real and significant. This conclusion was verified by examining the anomalous reporting of exactly 600 votes for Hamed Karzai at 24 different polling stations. More so, this statistical bias was absent in the final certified vote counts, because these aberrant tallies were discarded by the ECC. The vote certification process was not based on statistical methods, but our findings appear to be consistent with the outcome of the IEC certification process. The analysis of statistical voting anomalies may be useful as an independent adjunct method for monitoring and enforcing legitimate electoral processes.
The findings that we have presented are agnostic with respect to the motivation and mechanism of the voting irregularities identified. Given the lead possessed by Mr. Karzai going into the election [1] , the adverse publicity garnered would seem to outweigh any possible advantage that might be gained through widespread election fraud [8] . Simpser [22, 
To influence future voter behavior and participation
To the above list, I would add two additional possible motivations:
6. Raw demonstration of local power/authority
A "false-flag" demonstration intended to embarrass the inevitable winner
Although any of these are possible factors in a given election, Simpser favors influencing future voter behavior and participation as a major factor in the majority of cases. His hypothesis is that overwhelming victories by one party may suppress future voter turnout by the oppositionparticularly if there are mechanisms that can reward or punish voters as a function of their choices [22, p. 20] . This argument is advanced through the analysis of a formal multi-equilibrium voting model that incorporates these assumptions. In Simpser's model, multiple equilibrium may exist for the same set of model parameterizations, given different model inputs. For example, there could be one equilibrium for a scenario in which a low opposition turnout creates a high probability of an incumbent victory, leading to suppressed turn out of the opposition at the next election -and a subsequent incumbent victory. Conversely, there may be another model equilibrium for a high opposition turnout that creates a low probability of an incumbent victory, while increasing the probability for a high opposition turnout -and opposition victory -in the next election as well. [22, p. 21] .)
Given the data at hand, there is no way to test which of the above factors -if any -played a significant role in the 2009 Afghanistan presidential election. We present these considerations only to demonstrate that an "excessively" corrupt election may provide long-term benefits to the winner, and these benefits may be perceived as justifying the risk and adverse publicity so engendered.
If knowledge of the statistical techniques described herein becomes widespread, an interesting question is whether knowledgeable individuals could exploit this information to modify or fabricate electoral counts in a way that evades statistical detection. With proper training and/or feedback, human subjects are capable of constructing sequences of numbers that are effectively random [15] . Sets of random numbers in the desired range of values could also easily be distributed to members of a group in advance, or in real-time by cell phone or texting. The question as to whether such strategies could be realistically implemented under the time pressures imposed by a vote count, and in the presence of neutral observers, remains an open question. The statistical biases described here, such as non-uniform distribution of ultimate digits, are manifest at the district or country level, but not at the level of a single polling station.
A high level of centralized planning would be required in order to successfully fabricate apparently unbiased distributions of voting tallies at the district or county level.
